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Anatomyof Exchange Control Regimes
Inthis chapter, we propose to delineate the alternative forms that direct con-
trols can, and often do, take under exchange control regimes.' These
possibilities are illustrated extensively from the country studies. They are also
taxonomically organized in a functional fashion: thus many so-called ad-
ministrativedetails,whichareoftenconsideredtobe economically
uninteresting, are shown to be of economic importance, having distinct effects
on economic efficiency and on income distribution. The chapter concludes
with a brief delineation of the price measures that often co-exist with the direct
controls under the exchange control regimes.
I. CONVENTIONAL THEORY
The analysis of quantitative restrictions in the trade-theoretic literature has
generally relied on the so-called equivalence proposition. This Marshallian
proposition asserts that tariffs and quotas are basically equivalent in their real
effects, the only difference being in their revenue (and, to that extent, in their
income-distributional) effects, as noted in Figure 2-1 and the legend thereto.
Thus, if a quota were to be replaced by a tariff set at a rate that equals the ratio
of the import premium to the c.i.f. import price, the "real" effects on
domestic and international equilibrium values of production, consumption,
and prices would be identical. The only difference would be that the govern-
ment would now pick up the import premium as tariff revenue.
Related to this basic equivalence proposition, of course, is the standard





The Equivalence of Tariffs and Quotas Under Perfect Corn-
(DD and SS are the domestic demand and supply curves for a product. SF is the foreign supply
curve. A tariff at rate BA/OA shifts SF upward and reduces imports from KL to EF. EFGHis then
the import tax revenue. Alternatively, an "equivalent" import quota of EFunits could be imposed,
leading to the same equilibrium except that AB/OA would now be the import premium rate on
c.i.f. import price and the revenue EFGH would now accrue to the holders of the import licenses.)
schedules of foreign exchange. The QR-equilibrium price of foreign exchange
would then be lower than the "true" equilibrium price, the lower quantities
would be cleared at an import-premium-inclusive price, and it would generally
be argued that the same QR equilibrium could be equally achieved by an
equivalent tariff on imports (which would make the effective exchange rate on
imports equivalently higher than the effective exchange rate for exports), as
noted in Figure 2-2 and the legend thereto.
Such "equivalence" notions have typically provided the underlying con-
ceptual basis for many quantitative and descriptive studies of the trade and
payments policies of LDCs. An excellent example is the World Bank study of
the structure of LDC protection, which does not extend to discussion of many
of the caveats that must surround the resort to the equivalence assumption.2 At











Quantity of Foreign Currency
Figure 2-2.The Foreign Exchange Market and Overvaluation.
(DDand SS are the supply and demand curves for foreign exchange. The equilibrium price should
be JF. However, QRs peg the exchange rate at OC, resulting in quantity OE of foreign currency be-
ing supplied.Thisamount clears the market at domestic price OA, the difference AC then
representingthepremium on foreign exchange and the premium rate being AC/OC.)
literature that the Marshallian equivalence assumption will hold only under
singular circumstances. Yet, as will be evident below, even this theoretical
literatureis concerned only with a narrow set of non-equivalence cir-
cumstances and leaves out many aspects of exchange control allocation
mechanisms in practice that, as the country studies in the Project illustrate,
have definite efficiency and distributional effects that are asymmetrical to
those that would obtain if the same quotas were replaced by ad valorem tariffs
(levied at rates identical to the observed ratio of import premium to c.i.f. im-
port prices under the quota regime).
Thus, the conventional equivalence proposition has been shown in the
theoretical literature to depend on special restrictions. Within the Marshallian
framework, Bhagwati has shown that equivalence can break down when the
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production, export supply, or quota holding, that is, institutional assumptions
that are not exactly foreign to the economic scene of many LDCs.3 Moreover,
within the same partial-equilibrium framework, Fishelson and Flatters, as well
as Pelcovits, have discussed the relative merits of quotas and tariffs under con-
ditions of uncertain supply and/or demand using a two-period analytical ap-
proach to rank, with respect to welfare, the two instruments for optimal
restriction of trade and to achieve target level of domestic production respec-
tively.4 Their analysis implies that, if the policy instrument cannot be flexibly
adjusted to the situation materializing when uncertainty is resolved, the
equivalence of tariffs and quotas, as defined, will not hold. Next, McCulloch
and Johnson have shown that proportionally distributed quotas (i.e., as when
import licenses are assigned pro rata to importable production, as with U.S.
oil imports) will produce differential welfare levels from tariffs (or "normal"
quotas), while achieving the same "non-economic" objectives such as targeted
levels of imports or import-to-production ratios.5 Although they do not con-
sider the equivalence question in the sense defined here (i.e., if the observed
premium under the quota equilibrium is replaced by a tariff set at the rate
defined by the premium-to-landed-price-of-import, the equilibrium values of
prices, production, and consumption, domestically and abroad, will not
change), it is readily shown that, if the premium observed under a propor-
tionally distributed quota regime is turned instead into an explicit tariff, the
resulting equilibrium will not be equivalent.
Finally, using general equilibrium analysis, Rodriguez and Tower have
recently demonstrated that, in a retaliation analysis of the Cournot-Johnson
variety, the retaliation process, using optimum tariffs, may lead to welfare im-
provement of either country and to tariff cycles, whereas the same process, us-
ing instead optimum quotas, would lead inexorably to an erosion of world
trade.6
A little reflection will show that what is essentially at the bottom of these
demonstrations of non-equivalence is the breakdown of the implicit Mar-
shallian assumption that the supply and demand schedules are given. If they
can change exogenously (to the use of quotas or tariffs), then non-equivalence
will arise purely because the policy instruments being compared are not flexi-
ble and cannot be adjusted parametrically to suit the new supply and/or de-
mand schedules. This is clearly the case in the analysis of uncertainty by
Fishelson-Flatters and Pelcovits. If the supply and/or demand schedules will
change endogenously (to the use of the trade policy instrument), then the
equivalence will generally break down regardless of flexibility in the use of the
tariffs/quotas. This latter is clearly the case in Bhagwati's demonstration
where the introduction of monopoly in his analysis of quota holding and of
domestic production involves differential, policy-related shifts in the supply
and demand schedules; in the McCulloch-Johnson case where proportionally12 ANATOMY OF EXCHANGE CONTROL REGIMES
distributed quotas affect supply incentives; and in the Rodriguez-Tower
analysis where the duopolistic responses of the retaliating countries generate
quite different offer curves during the retaliation process so that optimal
policy response is also correspondingly different at each step.7
While therefore these recent theoretical developments have underlined the
strictly limited, almost negligible, scope of the equivalence proposition, the
sources of non-equivalence that they formalize are themselves only a small
subset of the many different possibilities that are to be encountered in reality
and, in fact, are to be found in the countries studied under the present Project.
Thus, take only three examples. (1) Under some exchange control regimes,
quotas of imported raw materials are assigned to approved industrial users pro
rata to their capacity (somehow defined). As argued later, this obviously
creates (ceteris paribus) an incentive to add to capacity in the presence of ex-
cess capacity since capacity attracts premium-carrying import allocations.
(2) Alternatively, consider the case of inefficiency following rather from the
specification of strict non-transferability of imported raw materials. In the
absence of illegal markets, or coincidental balancing of demands and supplies
in specific markets, serious bottlenecks could arise with magnified income
losses. (3) Or, consider the case where all capital goods imports are controlled
to restrict domestic entry; all raw material imports are allocated, pro rata to in-
stalled capacity, to the existing producers; and competing imports are also
strictly regulated in the interest of domestic producers. In this case, there is vir-
tually no real competition with possible efficiency consequences on cost-
minimization, and so on.8
Clearly, therefore, efficiency, and related distributional, consequences
will follow from the methods of allocating quotas (as is, in fact, evident also
from the existing theoretical analysis of the proportionally distributed quotas
already alluded to). We proceed therefore to a taxonomy of the various ways
in which imports are, in fact, regulated under exchange control regimes
developing our classification in, we hope, a manner that should lend itself to
systematic analysis of the consequences of different types of exchange control
regimes. We also take the opportunity to illustrate our taxonomic possibilities
by reference to the country studies. In fact, it is these studies that have sug-
gested the different possibilities. We shall also account, insofar as is possible,
for the "reasons" that may explain the presence of these different features in
our countries' exchange control systems at different times.
II. REGULATING IMPORTS
We begin first by distinguishing among alternative characteristics of import
control systems. We can analyze import control regimes by their features onREGULATING IMPORTS 13
five different dimensions (each of which has implications for economic effi-
ciency and income distribution):
1. The regulation of imports by source
2. The regulation of imports by commodity composition
3. The regulation of imports by end use (in the broadest sense)
4. The regulation of imports by payments conditions
5.Theregulation of imports by the degree and kind of restrictions on the
disposal of the licenses (or the imports thereunder) once one or more of the
preceding forms of regulation have been attempted9
While we focus initially on methods of regulating imports, we proceed
then to discuss briefly alternative forms of regulating exports. The methods of
operating exchange restrictions on capital account also can vary but less so and
are well understood; hence we forego discussing them here. Besides, few coun-
tries are characterized by or aim at achieving restriction-free capital accounts.
The debate among the proponents and opponents of exchange control regimes
thus is focused on the control of current account, as distinct from capital ac-
count, transactions.
A. Regulation of Imports by Source
A number of our country studies show that the exchange control regime was
characterized by restrictions on imports by source. But the reasons for such a
phenomenon were diverse. Three were particularly relevant during the 1960s.'°
1. AID-TYING.
One of the reasons for specification of source on import licenses was aid-
tying. Through the 1960s, aid came to be increasingly tied by source (and by
commodity specification). The donor countries, when in deficit, thought it
necessary to avoid any leakage of their funds into purchases from the surplus
countries. And the surplus countries followed suit by giving in to their export-
ing interests. The Germans found it difficult to counter their exporters who
complained that their American rivals could compete for German-aid-
financed contracts whereas they could not tender for the U.S.-aid-financed
purchases." Thus, the bulk of aid flows came to be tied by source by the sec-
ond half of the l960s.'2
The source specification of import licenses from the United States, the
United Kingdom, Japan, and other aid donors was thus evident in Colombia,
Pakistan, Israel,India, Phillippines, South Korea, Ghana, and Turkey,
among our countries)3 One example should illustrate. Thus, in Colombia,
Carlos Diaz-Alejandro has shown that the use of import controls to enforce14 ANATOMY OF EXCHANGE CONTROL REGIMES
aid-tying to U.S. sources was definitely prevalent and his amused comment
thereon is worth quoting:'4
INCOMEX and related institutions took strong measures to divert purchases
toward U.S. products. ... Thosewere the days of bitter wrangling over
"positive" and "negative" lists, "additionality." U.S. officials were in the
awkward position of simultaneously urging Colombians to liberalize import con-
trols, to use controls to enforce tying, and to stop using controls to divert imports
toward bilateral partners, such as Spain and the socialist countries.
2. BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS.
An equally important cause of source-tying of imports, for several of the
countries in the Project, was the bilateral trade agreements. These agreements
were often signed by LDCs with one another and were of special importance in
their trade with the Soviet-bloc countries. In what is probably the most impor-
tant instance of the latter relation, the share of Egypt's trade with Eastern
Europe rose fivefold from 1950 to 33.5 percent of imports and 60.7 percent of
exports in 1970.'
The standard practice in such agreements was to stipulate that the rubles,
or any non-convertible currency, so earned must be spent on imports from the
country whose currency had been earned from exports under that bilateral
agreement. A typical consequence was, of course, that such source-tied import
licenses were often sold in the (legal or illegal) market at significantly lower
premiums than import licenses without such source restriction, as in India.
The relatively short-lived geographical restriction of Israeli import licens-
ing was clearly due to bilateral agreements. As Michaely notes:'6
Paradoxically, significant geographic discrimination started only in 1953,
when the general restrictiveness of the system was already rapidly diminishing.
This discrimination clearly originated on the export side. In those years, as some
capacity for industrial exports developed, it was assumed that such exports would
flow provided there was access to protected foreign markets, the instrument for
protection being bilateral trade and payments agreements. Consequently, Israel
entered into a number of such agreements, in which the partner country was to
purchase from Israel mainly industrial products while Israel would buy in ex-
change mainly foodstuffs and raw materials. The most important partner country
to such an agreement was Turkey, with Yugoslavia coming next. Stated in terms
of convertible currencies, Israel's imports from these countries were clearly more
expensive than similar goods in the free world market. Obviously, each of the
partners to such an agreement, tried to sell to the other its most expensive goods
and to exclude exports which could compete freely in convertible-currency
markets. Although Israel used a specific price mechanism designed to compensate
importers for these price differences .., thismechanism in itself was quite
often inadequate; so that the government resorted to the QR system as a means of
directing israel's import trade toward bilateral agreement countries.REGULATING IMPORTS 15
For Ghana as well, Clark Leith has noted the determining influence of
bilateral trade pacts on the sourcewise specification of import licenses during
the Nkrumah regime in the 1960s:'7
The licensing system during 1962 and part of 1963 was not well designed to
induce importers to purchase from bilateral-pact countries. Licenses were valid
for importation of the specified items from any country. While official entities
were redirecting their purchases, for private importers the only apparent advan-
tage that might be achieved by purchasing from trade-pact countries revolved
around payment in local currency to the bilateral account in the Bank of Ghana
and the consequent reduction in problems associated with arranging payment to
suppliers. This was seldom enough to offset the traditional ties with West Euro-
pean and U.S. suppliers. The result of this situation was a substantial under-
subscribing of the bilateral accounts in 1962, yielding a positive net balance in
bilateral clearing accounts of nearly NC6 million. This phenomenon and its
meaning were not unnoticed, and in 1963 specific licenses distinguished between
trade-pact sources and other areas. In addition imports of certain goods (8 com-
modities) could be obtained only from those countries, and 20 percent of other
specified imports (28 commodities) were to come from trade-pact countries. For
1964 the redirection of licenses to bilateral trade-pact countries was strengthened.
A special exchange allocation was provided, and a list of 35commodities
developed which permitted purchases only in bilateral-pact countries. Further, in
order to discriminate among the various bilateral partners, the system of simply
distinguishing between bilateral partners as a group and all others was abandoned
in favor of specifying the bilateral country from which the licensed commodity
had to be imported.
3. PREFERENTIAL TRADE ARRANGEMENTS.
A related reason for source-tying of import licenses, noted by Carlos
Diaz-Alejandro for Colombia, is the existence of preferential trading ar-
rangements (e.g., the Andean Common Market), which, in practice, imply not
merely preferential tariffs but also occasionally source-tied import licenses.
Likewise, Chile also had some source-tying of import licenses because of
preferential trade arrangements. Thus, in the 1960s, Chile signed two such
agreements: the Treaty of Montevideo, which initiated LAFTA, and the
Bogota Agreement, which initiated the Andean subregional group.'8
4.NON-CONVERTIBILITYOF CURRENCIES.
A fourth reason for source specification of import licenses was the general
non-convertibility of currencies in Western Europe. The source specification
of licenses merely reflected then the fact that the foreign currencies earned, or16 ANATOMY OF EXCHANGE CONTROL REGiMES
"released" (in case of sterling balances accumulated during World War II by
countries such as Egypt and India), were not convertible and had therefore to
be spent, if at all, in the countries that issued them or accepted them (as with
sterling in the sterling area). This reason for source specification of import
licenses, of course, became inoperative as the Western European currencies
became convertible in the l95Os.'
B. Regulation of Imports by Commodity Composition
Specification of the items authorized for importation was, of course, an
almost standard feature of the licenses issued under the exchange control
regimes of the countries studied in the Project. Occasionally it was combined
with source specification—as in the case of India—so that there was a double
restriction with rather serious consequences that we shall consider presently.
The reasons for itemwise or compositional specification of import licenses
were diverse.
1. AID-TYING.
Aid-tying was again a reason for such itemwise specification. The source-
tying of aid, by itself, was soon discovered to be subject to substitution
possibilities, especially when non-project aid was given. To make source-tying
more effective, commodity specification in the import licenses was increasing-
ly sought by donor countries. Thus, typically Japanese yen credits (aid) were
available for specific commodities, U.S. aid funds for importing U.S. steel,
and so on.2°
The donor countries often argued (with much truth) that they tried to
foresee what the recipient-country importers would buy and only then to agree
on the list of permissible imports. Insofar as this was a correct description of
the process, the cost of such tying would be less than when the tying looked
rather to the donor-country's export interests.2' We must also note here aid-in-
kind, for example, PL480 surplus disposal of wheat, cotton, and other com-
modities, chiefly from the United States, into countries such as India,
Pakistan, Israel, and Chile.
2. PROTECTION.
Quite aside from aid-tying by commodity specification, our countries
showed quite endogenous reasons for administering import licenses subject to
such specification. The most obvious and persistent reason was, of course, the
protective one. An important aspect of the QR regimes in all the countries
studied was the eventual utilization of the QRs to confer varying degrees of
"automatic" protection to domestic activity. "Saving foreign exchange" oftenREGULATING IMPORTS 17
became an adequate excuse for protecting domestic industry against import
competition. "Prohibited" lists of importable items were also typically used at
times to ensure such protection.
The extreme examples of such protective use of the QR regime are the In-
dian rule of indigenous availability and the (early) Brazilian law of similars,
which virtually ruled out imports when local substitutes were available. In the
Indian case, the authorities maintained (inadequate) lists of locally producing
firms in different products and the burden of proof was on the import-license
applicants to show that they could not physically (as distinct from economical-
ly) utilize their output.22 The situation was so odd that, like the East European
jokes, it found its way into humor as in the story of the minister inaugurating a
hospital. Having been taken to witness a surgery prior to cutting the ribbon,
the minister announced in his speech that it was a matter of pride for the coun-
try that the hospital was using indigenously manufactured equipment and that,
at the surgery he had seen, the anesthetic used had also been "local"!
The less extreme versions of the protective nature of itemwise specifica-
tion of import licenses (as also of prohibited lists) are well illustrated by the
Colombian case. Carlos Diaz-Alejandro brings this out gently but firmly:23
If the application is satisfactory in form, the INCOMEX staff next examines
whether products similar to those requested are produced locally. Extensive files
on domestic production have been built up during the last few years. There is at
this point a frank and clear protectionist bias; in case of doubt, the presumption
is that local goods are indeed fully satisfactory candidates for import replace-
ment, at least in their physical attributes. Prospective importers whose requests
have been turned down on these grounds bear the burden of demonstrating to IN-
COMEX that the local product is in fact different from the proposed imports
because of quality, product specification, or other reasons. Price differences,
unless extreme, are not considered valid grounds for importing. INCOMEX occa-
sionally brings together the potential importer and the local import-competing
producer, to iron out serious disagreements regarding prices, quality, and
specifications. INCOMEX officials occasionally visit plants of import-competing
firms to verify their capacity, output quality, and other characteristics, a time-
consuming, subjective, and ad-hoc practice.
The INCOMEX's arguments about occasionally verifying or raising quality
issues with indigenous suppliers are, of course, paralleled by the Indian
DGTD's arguments to the same effect; they surely carry little weight, given the
protective thrust of the regime.24
For Israel, Michaely has documented an equally firm use of the quotas to
confer domestic protection, although the regime was to be adapted fairly early
in the game to restrict the degree of protection that could be so obtained.
Thus, in Israel, there existed a general directive to prohibit any imports of
goods that were produced domestically. A declaration by a manufacturer to18 ANATOMY OF EXCHANGE CONTROL REGIMES
the Ministry of Commerce and Industry that the manufacturer was producing
a given good was usually sufficient for the prohibition of imports of the good.
During the 1950s a public commission "for the protection of local industries,"
associated with the ministry, operated with the announced purpose of deciding
on requests for protection. However, as Michaely notes, with protection by
total import prohibition afforded almost automatically, the commission
handled applications of importers who argued that, in their case, imports
should be allowed despite the fact that they competed with existing local pro-
duction. The working of the commission was subject to rules regarding such
things as how much excess cost would be permitted to domestic production. In
practice, however, Michaely notes that decisions were made ad hoc and "occa-
sions on which imports were allowed because local prices were found to be ex-
cessive were rare indeed."25
The use of "prohibited" import lists to protect domestic production is
also noted by Clark Leith for Ghana. Thus, in the instance of the import
liberalization beginning with the July 1967 devaluation, Ghana simultaneously
expanded the list of restricted or prohibited imports amounting to some eighty
or more items primarily as a response to pressure by domestic manufacturers
already engaged in production.26
Anne Krueger has also noted for Turkey the definite tendency to shift im-
portable items, once they became domestically produced, from the "liberalized"
(L) list to the "quota" (Q)andthe "prohibited" (P) lists.27 In an interesting
time-series examination of three 100-commodity samples of items on the im-
port lists, she mapped out the transition matrices for these items, tracing their
classification under the three (L, Q,andP) categories in successive programs
spread from August 1959 to January 1971. These transition matrices are
reproduced here in Table 2-1. They show rather vividly the greater fluctuations
in the import-classification treatment of commodities in the early days of plan-
fling (during the period from the 3rd to the 16th Import List)—as reflected in
the increased importance of the diagonal elements (in the latter period from
the 16th to the 24th Import List).28
3. PRIORITY NOTIONS.
Leaving aside the protective rationale for regulating the imports of
specific goods, some of the countries studied also aimed to regulate the other
(non-competitive) imports on "priority" notions of one kind or another. The
most extreme example was India where the AU (actual user) licenses issued to
producers for imports of intermediates were item specified in considerable
detail to ensure that only the (priority) approved production would be made
feasible. This also required that value and/or quantity limits were specified for
the listed importables, in addition to the list of permissible imports, on each
license.
Perhaps the main reason why itemwise specification of import licensesREGULATING IMPORTS 19
Table2-1.Transition Matrices, 100-Commodity Samples: Turkey
Sample 1
1. 3rd to 16th Import List
Sample 2 Sample 3
From: L Q P T L Q P T L Q P T
To: L 16 12 0 28 14 13 7 34 15 7 12 34
Q 4 46 0 50 4 32 15 51 3 24 9 36
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To: L 22 7 1 30 28 5 1 34 30 0 8 38
Q 4 39 3 46 3 36 4 43 4 34 12 50
P 2 4 18 24 3 10 10 23 0 2 10 12






Source: Krueger, Turkey,op.cit., Chapter VI, page 32, Table VI-4.
frequently arose was the desire to ensure the domestic availability of "essen-
tial," imported goods. Thus, in the Philippines, quotas were determined
generously for priority items and restrictively for "non-essentials," the dif-
ferent items of interest having been initially classified into four groups.29
Moreover, the list of import classes was later increased in the 1950s from four
to nine groups, and as in India and Turkey in particular, a definite tendency
existed to shift consumer goods not regarded as highly essential into very
restrictive import groups. For example, 52 out of the 190 consumer items
shifted in the Philippines between 1953 and 1959 were placed in the
unclassified group, a move resulting in the virtual banning of imports of these
items.3°
The degree and nature of specification by items therefore varied among
the countries and within countries over time, depending on the balance of
payments position and prospects, the degree and nature of aid dependence and
aid-tying, the pressure of protective interests, and the susceptibility of the
governments to notions of "priority" in resource-allocation decisions.
Note also the general point that the de jure specification of itemwise,
source, and other restrictions is, to some extent, an inverse function of the
degree to which such purposes can be de facto achieved by indirect in-20 ANATOMY OF EXCHANGE CONTROL REGIMES
ducements cum penalties on deviant behavior. Thus, on source discrimination,
it is occasionally the case that importers can be and are nudged into importing
from specific areas even when area restrictions are not explicitly specified. The
penalty for not abiding by the implicit restrictions is usually the elimination of
access to future licenses and, given the profits from the premiums thereon,
that indeed can be a deterrent. In fact, according to some aid-recipient of-
ficials, aid-tying by source has at times been "enforced" in this way—via the
prospect of aid reduction if "additionality" criteria were not met in importing
from the donor source.3' Nonetheless, having made the point that the restric-
tions on import licenses may be de facto, rather than de jure, we must note
that none of our countries has shown much hesitation in specifying the bulk of
its intended restrictions on a de jure basis.
4. Goors vs. BArs.
Next, while there is no new wrinkle here, we should also list the prohibi-
tion of "bads" that all trade regimes are addressed to: for example, the pro-
hibition of heroin imports except for prescribed uses.
5. PROBABILITY OF ILLEGAL CAPITAL FLOWS.
Finally, we may note the resort to regulation, including occasional pro-
hibition, of imports of goods likely to be instruments for effecting illegal
capital transfers. As discussed at greater length in Chapter 4 on Illegal Trans-
actions and Exchange Control, this was the case with used-goods imports in
Turkey and Colombia. It also led to closer scrutiny and regulation of imports
of capital goods under direct foreign investment in India.
In conclusion, we should also note in regard to itemwise control of im-
ports that the different countries in the Project used a variety of administrative
means to implement such control. Moreover, the labels used for similar
methods were quite diverse; for example, "automatic approval" items in
South Korea were essentially the same as "open general license" items in
Pakistan and India. However, one general substantive distinction between
alternative means used is perhaps worth stressing and comes from the South
Korean reform of 1967. Korea then shifted from a "positive list" to a
"negative list" system of import control. Under the positive list system, only
those items listed in the trade program could be imported or exported, as
specified in that program. Under the negative list regime, however, the trade
program listed only items whose imports (or exports) were prohibited or
restricted.32 Thus, all other (unlisted) items were routinely importable under
the automatic approval (AA) umbrella. This shift clearly increased flexibility
considerably; but this, in turn, basically reflected a desire to have fewer im-
ports tied by specification. In the absence of such an objective, the relative
weight of the negative list to the AA imports would surely have increased,
nullifying the flexibility attributed to the negative-list regime.REGULATING IMPORTS 21
C. Regulation of Imports by End Use
Quite aside from the specification of importable items and permissible source
in import licenses, all QR regimes can be characterized by what end uses they
seek to allow. Essentially, these regimes have to settle the question: "How
much should be given to whom for what use?" The corresponding regulations
thus have two component aspects: (1) Allocation by functional end use (e.g.,
production vs. consumption, production for export vs. domestic sales, invest-
ment vs. consumption) and(2) allocation among rival claimants once the
functional end use was determined (e.g., division of licenses among different
regions, between large and small applicants, among different industries,
among different firms within an industry, between the private and the public
sectors)
1. FUNCTIONAL END USE.
The division of available foreign exchange among alternative functional
end uses was common to all our countries though the extent and pattern dif-
fered. The most recurrent patterns here related to (1) imports of capital goods,
consumer goods, and intermediates, (2) imports of intermediates for domestic
as against export production, (3) import licenses given to reward exporters,
and (4) import licenses given to attract remittances, capital inflows, and so on.
We will consider each in turn.
a. Capital Goods, Consumer Goods, and Intermediates. The desire to control
the amount of foreign exchange going to the importation of consumer goods
has been evident in a number of LDCs, and not just the countries in this Proj-
ect, since the last world war. The impulse toward this policy in many LDCs has
been clearly the view that the imports of "inessential" consumer goods should
be considered a "non-priority" utilization of scarce foreign exchange, a theme
that recurs throughout the studies in our Project as well. This philosophy,
which may be aptly described as "priority illusion in foreign exchange utiliza-
tion" because it rarely prevented the countries in question from the allocation
of resources for producing the same consumer goods, is to be contrasted with
the economic philosophy under which countries, such as India and Ghana,
professed actual plans and targets for import substituting in these consumer
goods industries and utilized the import-control system to provide the
necessary, automatic protection. In this latter case, the targets were buttressed
by industrial licensing (in India and Pakistan) and corresponding control over
the expansion of capacity in these, as in other, industries. The targets were
progressively worked out by reference to overall macro-planning techniques
such as consistency models of different types ranging from crude material
balances to optimizing, intertemporal, and multisectoral models (as in India's
case).22 ANATOMY OF EXCHANGE CONTROL REGIMES
Note further that the preceding analysis applies to "inessential" con-
sumer goods and that "essential" consumer goods such as food have remained
relatively large proportions of total imports in many LDCs. Furthermore, as in
Chile, whenever foreign exchange "shortage" became more acute, govern-
ments have often tended to postpone the importation of capital goods rather
than of essential consumer goods for obvious reasons.33
At the empirical level, the data in a recent analysis by Bhagwati and
Wibulswasdi of the shift in import structure of twenty-eight LDCs during
1954-1956 to 1965-1967 may be cited here for they broadly confirm the relative
decline in the imports of consumer goods as a group and of "inessential" con-
sumer goods in particular.34 Moreover, on comparing with the shift in import
structure of twelve DCs (developed countries), these authors find that the ma-
jor contrast is in the category of non-food consumer goods, where the DCs ac-
tually experienced an increase in the relative share of this category in overall
imports whereas, as seen from Table 2-2, the LDCs experienced a decline.
While the Bhagwati-Wibulswasdi LDCs overlap with only about half of the
countries in the present Project, it is clear that the generally low and declining
share of non-food consumer goods category in overall imports has
characterized many of the countries in the Project, especially India, Israel,
Philippines, Turkey, and Egypt.35 In particular, the import structure for most
of the countries in the Project has shifted heavily in favor of intermediates and
capital goods.
In keeping with this shift, it is interesting that the distinction between pro-
ducers/users/industrialists on the one hand, and traders/sellers/importers on
the other, had become administratively built into the import-licensing pro-
cedures, with economic consequences that will be spelled out later. Thus, in In-
dia, the major categories of licenses were AU (actual user) and CG (capital
Table2-2.Comparison of the Shifts in the Import Structures in LDCs and DCs
Total of 28 LDCs
Percentage Shares in
Total Imports




1954-1956 1965-1967 Changes1954-1956 1965-1967Changes
I. Food and Beverage 16.6 14.6 —2.0 26.6 19.0 —7.6
II, Non-Food Consumer
Goods: 10.6 9.4 —1.2 4.9 10.1 +5.2
Durables 4.5 4.5No change 2.3 5.0 +2.7
Nondurables 6.1 .4.9 —1.2 2.7 5.1 +2.4
Ill. Total Consumer
Goods 27.2 24.0 —3.2 31.6 29.1 —2.5
Source: Bhagwati and Wibulswasdi, op. cit., Table 5, p. 235.REGULATING IMPORTS 23
goods), which were given directly to the producers and investors (who, in con-
sequence, enjoyed the benefit of the import premium themselves) and permit-
ted the imports of raw materials and capital equipment for use in production,
whereas an increasingly small category was the El (established importer) im-
port licenses, assigned to traders, and predominantly consisting of consumer
goods. The same division of licenses, and with the same tendency to give in-
termediate and capital goods licenses directly to producers rather than traders,
was to be found in Colombia and Turkey.
In the Turkish case, in particular, these producer allocations were af-
fected not directly from the licensing authorities to the producers but via the
chambers of commerce and of industry, which examined individual import
claims by their members and negotiated presumably for the resulting total im-
port bills with one another at the union of chambers and, in turn, with the of-
ficial authorities dispensing imports. In consequence of the competing claims
by traders and producers, as elsewhere, the Turkish situation was also marked
by a bifurcation of the traditional chamber of commerce and industry into two
chambers. As Anne Krueger remarks:36
The importers are of course interested in increasing the flow of resaleable
goods into the country, in receiving foreign-exchange allocations themselves and
in keeping finished goods on the list of eligible imports. Industrialists are by con-
trast interested in their own quotas of intermediate goods and raw materials and
in reducing the importers' quotas to limit competition with their products.
Furthermore, as elsewhere, the (value) proportion of import licenses going to
importers steadily went down in Turkey, from 48 percent in 1962 to 23 percent
in 197O.
We may now turn to the division of foreign exchange among capital
goods and intermediates, materials, and so on, for current production. Nearly
all the regimes studied in the Project divided up the "available" foreign ex-
change into allocations of raw materials and intermediates and of capital
goods. No criteria for this division can be discerned in the countries in the Proj-
ect except that, in countries that sought to maintain overall plans (as in India,
Pakistan, and Turkey), there was some attempt at providing for sufficient
capital goods imports to support the planned industrial investment.38 In prac-
tice, however, even in this regard, the fluctuating availability of foreign private
and official capital made for inevitable ad hocery, and few of the stated
targets in regard to provision of targeted capital goods imports were achieved
in the countries that practiced such targeting.39
b. Export-Import Links: Intermediates. The QR regimes in many of the
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evolution by schemes for linking the allocation of a fraction of their raw
materials and intermediates licenses to exporting producers. This phenomenon
occurred generally when the effects of the overvaluation on export perfor-
mance were becoming visible and attempts had to be mounted within the QR
framework to increase the export incentive.40
These links were either de jure or de facto. Thus, the de jure links typical-
ly took the form of some kind of import entitlement such as the early Indian
import entitlement schemes and the later import replenishment schemes.
Under these schemes, the producer-exporter was given allocations of licenses
to import raw materials in quantities that either replenished those used up in
the exportation or were provided in greater quantitites as an added incentive.
The defacto links consisted, on the other hand, in stressing to the producers
that, unless their export performance improved or was sustained, the "nor-
mal" allocations of AU (actual user) licenses to import raw materials could get
cut or that a better export performance would make the import authorities
look more kindly on future applications for spares, expansion, and so on.4'
Similar links were found in other countries as well: South Korea, Colom-
bia, the Philippines, and Chile, in particular. Thus, in the Colombian case,
Carlos Diaz-Alejandro argues that:42
[The import licensing] mechanism has been increasingly used to ensure that new
projects, particularly those granted tax or other advantages, commit part of their
expected output for exports; for several projects specific export targets have been
laid down at the time of their approval by INCOMEX in the form of formal con-
tracts. It is not in the INCOMEX style to insist rigidly on exact compliance with
such targets, but the companies know that systematic departures from these
promises can lead to a displeased and colder INCOMEX in the future.
A sample survey of Colombia's 1970 registered imports and statistical analysis
did indicate that, for the industrial importers, there was a very weak, negative
relationship between 1970 "minor exports" per 1970 imports and the chances
of getting import applications approved.43 But this has to be put against both
the INCOMEX claims that industrial exporters were treated better in the
award of import licenses and another analysis based on the same sample
survey that shows, for example, that for industrial importers, the average
characteristics of firms with rejected applications showed a substantially lower
level of minor exports during 1970 than the firms with approved applications.40
For the Philippines, Baldwin notes the No-Dollar Import Law of 1955 as
having been designed to encourage exports by permitting exporters to barter a
certain amount of their exports for imports, with the permitted imports mainly
restricted to producer goods and essential raw materials.45REGULATING IMPORTS 25
InChile, de facto links existed for large-scale mining and for other ex-
ports.46
c. Export-Import Links: Unrelated Goods. The export-import links occa-
sionally went beyond rewarding the producer-exporter with the intermediates
used in production. The import entitlements were made expendable on imports
of "unrelated" goods as a pure incentive. Thus, the Pakistan bonus voucher
scheme deliberately permitted the import of a number of high-premium con-
sumer goods items against the import entitlements earned by exporters eligible
for the scheme.47 Similarly, the Indian authorities had an unpublicized scheme
for importing, on an ad hoc basis, scarce dry fruit by exporters who needed
the "extra" incentive to complete export deals remuneratively.48 Frank and
others have also noted such a scheme for Korea where, in the latter part of
1966, an export-import link system was reintroduced. Export performance was
linked with the import rights for popular consumer items and not merely to
imports of inputs for exported commodities. Thus, the exporters of radios and
electronic products were given import rights to television accessories, exporters
of domestically assembled watches and exporters to Switzerland the import
rights to Swiss watches, and so on.49
d. Links to Remittances et al. Finally, note that the functional end use of im-
port licenses, defined broadly to include their use to promote a specific
economic function (e.g., encouraging exports or investment), was not
restricted merely to export-import links. It turned up in the form of links
designed to promote remittances, for example. Thus the national defense
remittance scheme, introduced in India in mid-1966, entitled the (inward-)
remitter to import licenses that fetched a sizeable premium in the market.5° In
Israel, they had the so-called "imports-without-payment" market with supply
fed from three sources: foreign capital transfers, immigrants' capital, and gifts
from abroad. Michaely notes that, by the end of 1948, the government allowed
foreign investors to transfer their capital in the form of goods from a specified
list on condition that foreign exchange amounting to 30 percent of the import
license be sold to the treasury at the official rate. Import licenses thus issued
were more or less marketable, although not in a sanctioned market.5'
2. ALLOCATIONS AMONG CLAIMANTS WITHIN CATEGORY OF END USE.
The functional end use having been decided, the most recurrent problems
for the authorities in our countries related to the allocation of the quotas
within each end-use category among competing claimants.26 ANATOMY OF EXCHANGE CONTROL REGIMES
a. Large vs. Small Applicants. It appears as if the majority of the QR.regime
authorities like to think of themselves as biasing access to imports in favor of
the smaller applicants. Indeed, in countries such as India and Pakistan, this
was considered to be one of the benefits of the import control system vis-à-vis
the market allocations.
In point of fact, little of the evidence produced in our country studies
would seem to support such a thesis: cx post outcomes appear to have been
disturbingly concentrated on the large-scale applicants, though one cannot
meaningfully assert that such concentration would have been higher or lower
under a non-QR market system.
Thus, in the Indian case, Bhagwati and Srinivasan argue that, while the
import control authorities claimed that the small-scale sector would benefit
from the control regime,
it is extremely difficult to take this ... seriously.In point of fact, there is reason
to conclude that the control system discriminated against the small-scale sector:
as when import cuts in face of sudden accentuation of the foreign exchange short-
age fell relatively more acutely on the small-scale sector and much less on the
(well-connected) larger firms.52
Similarly for South Korea, Frank and others note that under the Trade
Transaction Law of 1957 there were minimum export volumes, steadily rising,
before an exporter-importer could be registered by the authorities.53
For Ghana, however, Clark Leith indicates a deliberate bias in favor of
the larger importers:4
[For traders' imports] a system involving grades for importers was introduced,
with grades ranging from A (large trading firms) through D, based on historical
shares of turnover, taxes paid, and employment ...[Inthe post-Nkrumah
period] the system of grading commercial importers established in the early days
of import licensing was retained...Gradeswere assigned according to past
volume. Importers with N4 2 million annual volume over the period 1961 to 1965
were assigned the top grade. .. Withineach grade [alone] commercial importers
were assigned approximately equal foreign-exchange allocations. The objective in
this approach was to "obtain goods on competitive terms and at reasonable prices
to the consumers," hence the reliance on larger firms with proven trade and
financial contacts and facilities to ensure that the country had adequate supplies
of essential commodities.
The advantage of the larger claimants in the QR regime thus stemmed
from the desire of the authorities to have "reliable" firms with "proven ex-
perience," in the Ghanaian case. It was paralleled by the Colombian case
where the INCOMEX appears to have been happy with the simplicity and
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seemed to confer on the authorities. Thus, during 1970, Carlos Diaz-
Alejandro has estimated that only 119 companies and public institutions ac-
counted for nearly 48 percent of the total import bill. Moreover, some 500
private companies were not only major actors in the import field but also acted
as major exporters and tax collectors (i.e., generators) for the government. He
also found, on examining the reimbursable imports category, that the largest
industrial companies had the highest percentages of approved requests for im-
ports, and that the advantage of the very largest companies in percentage of
approvals went up when both the reimbursable and non-reimbursable requests
were considered together.55 His further comments on this issue are worth
quoting:56
Given the burden of work, and the speed with which applications must be
handled, there is an inevitable tendency to accept without much analysis most
"reasonable" requests from established, well-known (i.e., large) companies, and
to examine more closely and reject, in case of doubt or stringency, those of less
well-known, smaller newcomers, many of which may not even bother to
apply. .. [Thejuntal argues that at times of exchange stringency, proportional
cuts in import requests are larger for bigger than for smaller firms, and that it
tends more readily to overlook faulty request forms from small than from large
importers.
But, on balance, the larger and better-known importers find it easier than
others to communicate with the junta. Given the Colombian milieu, potential
small importers may actually exaggerate in their own minds the complications of
dealing with INCOMEX. .. Somejunta officials candidly admit that this may be
so, but. ,. arguethat there are no other practical ways of handling the enormous
mass of actual and potential applications. What is wrong, they ask, with tilting in
favor of applications from long-established corporations, with honorable
records, and of being skeptical of new and unknown applicants, who may turn
out to be no better than phony industrialists, disguised smugglers, and black-
market operators?
Aside from the ease of administration and the readier, access to IN-
COMEX by the "well-connected" larger companies, Carlos Diaz-Alejandro's
analysis also points to additional factors that helped to bias the concentration
of imports toward the largest firms. These included the fact that the larger in-
dustrial companies could get more non-reimbursable licenses against foreign
credits and investment (to which they had greater access because of their size in
the first place).
The bias of the import-licensing mechanism against the small-scale sector
was noticeable in Pakistan as well. Nurul Islam observes that this bias arose
principally from the fact that the firms in large-scale industry had access to
their own allocations of (premium-exclusive) raw materials, whereas the small-
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allocations in any case were steadily diminished (as in India). This situation
continued right up to 1968, until which time the small-scale and cottage in-
dustries had to rely on commercial importers for the supply of both imported
raw materials and capital goods because the system of industrial licensing for
the distribution of import licenses based on the recommendation of the provin-
cial departments of industry was restricted to large-scale industry. The survey
conducted by the provincial governments for the assessment of the raw
material requirements covered only the registered firms in the large-scale in-
dustry. Thus, the units in large-scale industry had access to (at least a fraction
of their) raw material and capital goods imports at premium-exclusive, landed
prices. On the other hand, the units in the small-scale industries had no such
access and were also faced with possibly lower (prorata tocapacity) alloca-
tions of imports via commercial-importer licenses than their counterparts in
the large-scale industries.
In addition to this subtle implication of the licensing mechanism against
small-scale firms, the Pakistani import licensing system had the typical bias
against smaller firms that arose from making pro rata to capacity allocations
to producers or making historic-share allocations to commercial importers.
Thus, Nurul Islam has noted that, under the system of commercial licensing,
the controller in Pakistan distributed import licenses to traders or importers
who imported to resell in the market. The selection of "eligible importers"
from a large number of potential importers was made by the adoption of "a
rule of thumb," which defined eligible importers as those who had an import
performance to their credit during the period July 1950 to November 1952,
when there was essentially free importing under the open general license
(OGL) system. Each importer of the OGL period was then given a monetary
"category" for each type of good that the particular importer imported. The
monetary value of each category was determined by the average imports dur-
ing the five OGL shipping periods between July 1950 and December 1952. A
category was not a definite commitment by the government to issue to the im-
porter a license of equivalent value, but rather the actual value of each license
was expressed as a certain percentage of the monetary value of each category.
The variation in this percentage was the main instrument by which the con-
troller enforced a liberal or stringent import policy.57 A similar phenomenon
obtained in the allocation of industrial imports directly to producers. We will,
however, return to this theme later when we discuss the criteria for allocation
among firms within the same industry.
Altogether therefore the import allocations in many of the countries in
our Project would seem to have been biased in varying degrees in favor of the
larger applicants. The reasons included: (1) ease of administration in dealing
with smaller numbers of successful applicants; (2) a feeling that larger firms
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from foreign suppliers;58 (4) the greater access (and contacts) of the larger
firms to the bureaucracy and politicians, in general, and to the licensing
authorities, in particular; and (5)theimportant edge obtained by the larger
firms, whether traders or producers, quite simply because nearly all the licens-
ing authorities tended to allocate quotas pro rata to "past shares" or "capaci-
ty installed" or such size-related variables. The operative "fair-shares" rules
of thumb were therefore loaded in favor of larger quotas for the larger firms.
The reward of the rich was, much as in the market system, here and now, but
that of the poor was often in a later millenium!
b. Regional Allocations. The import control authorities have often had to
grapple with the problem of allocations among claimants from different
regions within the country. This is a distributional issue, much like the prob-
lem of large versus small applicants, but more explosive since interregional
politics are often important and, as Pakistan's experience demonstrates, can
be even critical.
The import control regime can be found to be justified on the ground that
it permits a "fair" or "balanced" regional distribution of import licenses. It is
argued that the market will not work in this way. But control regimes have not
often worked better either.
Thus, while INCOMEX in Colombia claimed, as do most licensing
authorities elsewhere, that regional considerations were important, they
resolutely refused to comply with persistent requests to open up regional of-
fices, citing possible corruption at regional level, and the complaints of inat-
tention and neglect continued from firms outside the Bogota and Medellin
region. Carlos Diaz-Alejandro's sample survey also seems to confirm the
possible validity of these complaints. The industrial companies in the
Bogota/Medellin region did better than those in the rest of the country in
terms of percentage of total import requests approved; and even if attention
were confined to the reimbursable requests, the percentage of approvals was
higher for Bogota and Medellin for both industrial and commercial
categories
ForPakistan, the neglect of the East Pakistan region by the licensing
authorities would appear to have been even more drastic. Yet, given the
economically less developed nature of the region compared to West Pakistan
and the lack of entrepreneurial activity and tradition on the same scale, it
would appear that the neglect was probably as much a consequence of the fact
that large importers were favored (for reasons discussed in the preceding
subsection) as it was politically motivated.
In India, the regional allocations of import licenses for investment and for
materials and intermediates were generally perceived to be satisfactorily
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allocations of most scarce items, including foreign exchange, and few regional
grievances in this regard were allowed to simmer on without some form of con-
ciliatory response. In short, thanks to the conciliatory and responsive nature
of the political regime, the precise regional allocations of import (as other)
licenses rarely became a matter of public debate and concern. The apparent
absence of this issue from divisive debate was a reflection, in fact, of the im-
portance attached to it prior to the allocational decisions.
Special attention to regional distribution of import licenses has been
noted also in Chile by Jere Behrman. In fact, the "special regimes" according
discriminatory treatment generally by region accounted for 30 percent of total
imports in 1961 and for as much as 74 percent of imports in 1970. The objec-
tive was to subsidize the integration of remote areas into the national
economy.6° However, it should be noted that the overwhelming bulk of the
discriminatory benefits for these remote areas took the form of price measures
(e.g., higher protective tariffs for industry) rather than biased, beneficial
allocations of imports through the control mechanism.
c. PublicSectorvs. Private Sector Allocations. Yet another basic problem of
allocation in many of our countries related to the division of available foreign
exchange between the public and the private sectors. This was a decision that
was rarely settled by letting public sector concerns get their "fair share" (in
any functional category) in the same fashion as the private sector concerns.
For one thing, many public sector concerns, including those undertaking
industrial activities, are in monopolistic positions in some of the countries in
our Project. This is true of Egypt and, in some instances, of Chile, Ghana, and
India as well. The allocations to these concerns then raise issues identical to
those underlying interindustrial allocations, as distinct from inttrfirm, intra-
industrial allocations.
Next, the public sector monopolies have sprung largely from iieological
reservations of certain industries (as in India) or overall sectors (as in Egypt)
on the ground that they are "key" or "basic" activities, represent "command-
ing heights of the economy," and so on. A "priority" allocation of scarce im-
ports to these public sector enterprises has thus frequently been a consequence
of these notions that led these activities into the public sector domain in the
first place.
Finally, when it comes to the allocation of materials and capital-goods
licenses to concerns in the public and private sectors belonging to the same in-
dustry (e.g., steel in India), the import authorities often seemed keen to claim
that no favors were shown to the public sector while the private sector asserted
the opposite. This was the case in India; and, for colombia, a bias in favor of
official import needs was reported by Alejandro Diaz.6' For the Philippines, as
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not subject to import quotas, implying a general view about the priority of all
governmental demands for imports. Similarly, in Chile, Behrman notes several
ways in which governmental importers managed to have better access to scarce
imports.62 Finally, we may note also that items such as weapons purchases are
always treated separately and that "embodied" aid such as PL480 surplus
food has always been channeled through public agencies. Hence the relative
division of these imports between the private and the public sectors is only an
academic question.
d. Interindustrial Allocations. The allocation of imported capital goods, and
of raw materials and intermediates, among alternative industries/activities was
naturally a primary function of all the control regimes in our Project.
1. Capital Goods. In regard to capital goods, the interindustrial allocations
tended to be aligned with the planned, targeted expansion of capacity in the
different industries in the countries where the method of targeting and often
concommitant industrial licensing was practiced. Thus, the criteria for alloca-
tion of capital goods imports have to be sought, in turn, in the more fun-
damental criteria that determined the basic choice of relative expansions of
different industries during a planning period. In turn, these targets tended to
reflect varying degrees of planning sophistication at a macro level, as stated
earlier. On the other hand, in countries such as Colombia and the Philippines
where no such targeting and industrial licensing were in vogue, the allocation
of foreign exchange among rival claimants in different industries appears to
have been more market-oriented. There was little attempt at regulating the in-
terindustrial allocation of capital goods (except insofar as the applying in-
dustry could use indigenously produced capital goods, in which case the pro-
tective rules could take over and the import applications denied). In such
"non-planned" regimes presumably the allocations of capital goods were
made to applicants on a first-come first-served basis until the foreign exchange
provided for this purpose ran out. A few exceptions were made for industries
producing "essential" items, the chief exception in most countries being
defense.63
A natural question, of some interest, is whether the import-licensing
authorities under either type of regime, with or without industrial capacity
targets and industrial licensing, attempted to refuse the allocation of capital
goods to industries that already had some excess capacity (thus implicitly try-
ing to use some type of "productivity" criterion to allocate imports). It ap-
pears that the different import-licensing authorities reached their decision on
this issue in light of three considerations: if there was excess capacity, the crea-
tion of additional capacity was wasteful; if additional capacity was not licensed,
the degree of competition in the industry would be reduced; and if aid or32 ANATOMY OF EXCHANGE CONTROL REGIMES
foreign private capital were available specifically for expanding capacity in an
industry, despite excess capacity therein, this opportunity should not be allowed
to lapse. Thus Leith notes for Ghana under the National Liberation Council
(NLC) that the import license system came to be used as an industrial licensing
system as well. The Ghanaian Ministry of Industries saw a conflict between the
need for competition among domestic producers and the wasteful expenditure
involved in duplicating underutilized domestic facilities. But during the NLC
period this was generally resolved in favor of "rationalization" of industries
and against new entrants.
For the Philippines as well, Baldwin argues that since 1970 the Central
Bank attempted to prevent foreign borrowing to expand investment in in-
dustries listed as "overcrowded."
In India, on the other hand, the balance of forces seems to have gone
more toward capacity creation in face of excess capacity. The targeting of
capacities under the plans implied that the corresponding allocations of
foreign exchange for supporting imports of capital goods would be more or
less sanctified. Moreover the import control authorities predominantly seem to
have confined themselves then to allocating the "available" foreign exchange
for intermediates among all the capacity holders according to "fair shares" (as
we shall presently note).
The main thrust in all the "planned" regimes appears to have been
toward capacity creation in light of explicit or implicit targets of industrial ex-
pansion. As Bhagwati and Srinivasan have noted, however, the working of the
import control regime seems to have also provided the private sector with in-
centives to add to capacity in the face of excess capacity. Unless this were so, it
would be difficult to see why entrepreneurs would choose to add to capacity
just because the import authorities were willing to give capital goods licenses
for such capacity creation. Thus, in India, the allocation of raw materials pro
rata to capacity installed implied that the installation of new capacity would
enable access to imported materials and hence to associated profits. We quote
Bhagwati and Srinivasan on the subtleties of the interaction between the licens-
ing rules and the creation of incentives to add to underutilized capacity in In-
dia :65
Thetendency to relate equity in allocations of AU licenses to installed
capacity led to an incentive to create capacity by linking the availability of
premia-fetching imports with creation of more capacity. Thus, as Bhagwati and
Desai have argued, an entrepreneur, with a given capacity that was underutilized
for lack of imported inputs, could not (under the Indian QR-regime) expand out-
put through additional utilization of capacity. The only way he could increase
production was by getting capacity installed and having some import quota allot-
ted to him on basis of it. But even if the entrepreneur were allowed access to more
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capacity, he would have to purchase inputs at import-premia-inclusive market
prices, whereas expansion of capacity would enable him to expand output by ac-
cess to premia-exclusive import allocations. This would then certainly bias,
ceterisparibus, hischoice between these two courses of action toward creating
more capacity. .
Evenmore important in practice. .. isthe fact that (for most industries, un-
til 1966 at least) licensing constrained the creation of capacity and QR policy
guaranteed domestic sales at high enough prices to let licensed firms make large
profits even at low levels of capacity utilization. Thus, even when there was excess
capacity, it would pay a new firm to enter the industry, provided it could get the
license to do so, then get its pro-rata-to-capacity share of scarce AU imports, and
still earn a large profit. On the other hand, with free entry and competition for
imported materials in the market, such a venture would have been untenable.
ii. Intermediates and Raw Materials. Few criteria can be distinguished among
the countries studied in the Project as far as the allocations of foreign ex-
change among different industries for their requirements of raw materials and
intermediates are concerned. "Essential" industries were favored, no doubt,
but the definition of essentials varied from capital goods industries to con-
sumer goods industries. Besides, in the regimes that claimed to plan their
growing industrialization, there was a real problem raised by the fact that
nearly all activities had been implicitly sanctioned or explicitly licensed, so that
nearly everything was "essential" or "priority." Undoubtedly, the end result
for the bureaucratic decision-making turned out in nearly all cases to be the
allocation of foreign exchange according to (I) some historic shares among in-
dustries, (2) targeted shares in total production during the planning period,67
(3) ad hoc bargaining and reflection of pressure groups, (4) "priority" notions
of varying operational importance68 and/or (5) outright corrufltion (as in Ghana
during part of President Nkrumah's regime, involving two of his ministers).69
It is of some interest to note, however, that consumer durables industries
appear to have been regarded as generally "luxury" or "inessential." Thus, in
India and Pakistan there is some evidence that the cut in allocation of their ac-
tual user (AU) licenses during acute foreign exchange crises was dispropor-
tionately higher than for the other industries.70 In Egypt as well, Hansen and
Nashashibi note that in 1965, when the foreign exchange crisis became acute,
automobile assembly imports were slashed. Since these industries were usually
set up at a very low scale, again in view of their "luxury" nature and the conse-
quent desire to contain the availability of such goods, the investment in their
capacity appears to have been doubly wasteful. Low scale meant that average
costs of production were excessive, and the deprivation of raw materials and
intermediates resulted in underutilization of even that low capacity. Both fac-
tors made it highly probable that an alternative strategy of merely importing
relatively cheaply the small number of such luxury items (e.g., air condi-34 ANATOMY OF EXCHANGE CONTROL REGIMES
tioners, cars, refrigerators) and shutting off their imports whenever foreign ex-
change availability got worse would have been more economical.
e. Interfirm Allocations. We need again to distinguish between the allocations
of capital goods and of raw materials and intermediates.
1. Capital Goods. For capital goods, to add to capacity or to invest afresh in
an industry, the firms that had access to the bureaucracy and to foreign
technology and credits appear invariably to have been favored with successful
applications to invest in nearly all the regions we have examined. This, in turn,
often meant, as we noted for Colombia earlier, that the larger firms were
relatively better off than the smaller firms under the import control
mechanism. In India, this happened again to be the case. The authorities were
to become conscious of the phenomenon after a decade of operation and tried
to bend the system in the direction of favoring smaller scale applicants by set-
ting up new guidelines for import and investment licensing, with possibly
harmful impact on the overall amount of investment in the economy.7'
ii. Intermediates and Raw Materials. In regard to intermediates and raw
materials for current production there appears to have been a common tenden-
cy to adopt "fair shares" as a working rule for interfirm allocations. The
precise rules, however, varied from pro rata to installed capacity to pro rata to
production in base year allocations. It is interesting that no import control
authority among the countries studied ever attempted to lay down explicitly
the rules in this regard, and varying elements of executive discretion always re-
mained, defying the analyst's ability to decipher what exactly were the criteria
utilized in the end.
For Ghana, Leith has noted how the Ministry of Industry utilized various
categories such as "essential consumer goods," "exporting industries," and
"import-substituting industries," and made initial allocations among them.
Then, for the interfirm allocations, Leith records a rather complex decision
process (as perceived by the authorities):72
The Ministry of Industries...attemptedto make pro rataallocations
among firms within a category based approximately on previous market shares
but taking into account their assessment of the firms' "performance" in such
things as employment, taxes paid, and what was called general efficiency of
operation.
The method of allocations used by the import control authorities in
Pakistanillustratesratherbetterthe"fair-shares"doctrine and the
modus operandi of its execution. A "quota system" was designed there to
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materials and spare parts. Each eligible industrial importer, called a "quota-
holder," was assigned a quota, specifying the importer's "requirements" for
industrial raw materials and spare parts for one shipping period. This enabled
the provincial directorates to determine simultaneously the commodities (i.e.,
spare parts and raw materials) that should be imported and the industrial im-
porters who were eligible to import them in each shipping period. These quotas
were revised every three years. The provincial directorates then determined the
percentage of the quota that each quota-holder would be allowed in each ship-
ping period,the percentage allowance reflectingthe foreign exchange
availability relative to total quota needs.
Two points finally need to be noted here. First, the tendency to go by
"fair-shares" rules was probably motivated as much by notions of fairness as
by the bureaucrat's desire to appear impartial and just. Any attempt at biasing
allocations in relation to "efficiency" or "performance," evaluated subjec-
tively by the bureaucrats, would have landed them into situations where
charges of corruption could have been freely laid at their doorstep. Second,
the effect of such "fair-shares" rules was to create economic incentives for in-
efficiency. Thus, for India, we have already noted in the preceding subsection
that the result was to encourage the expansion of capacity despite excess
capacity when the allocations tended to reflect shares in installed capacity in
the industry. Yet another effect was that the more efficient firms could not
readily drive out the inefficient ones by competing freely for more scarce raw
materials and intermediates. The effect of competition was thus blunted by the
import control regime that gave these imports at artificially low rates to both
the efficient and the inefficient firms in the first round.
f. Domestic vs. Foreign Applicants. Finally, although instances of this prac-
tice are infrequent, there is some evidence that the import allocations were used
to "indigenize" trade. The most striking example is furnished by the Philip-
pines where, under the 1950 Import Control Act, marked preference was given
to Filipino citizens and the Import Control Board was instructed to reserve 30
percent of the total import quota for any article in the fiscal year 1950-1951,40
percent in 195 1-1952, and 50 percent in 1952-1953 to new Filipino importers.
Furthermore, at least 60 percent of a company's stock had to be owned by
Filipinos for a firm to qualify under this provision of the law. Existing import
businesses, which had long been dominated by Westerners and Chinese, re-
ceived only nominal quota allocations. As a probable result of this policy,
Baldwin notes an increased Filipinization of the import trade. Thus, between
1948 and 1958, the value of imports by Filipinos rose from 23 percent to 54
percent, and the share of Chinese traders fell from 39 percent to 14 percent.73
A similar "Ghanaization" of business, using the import-licensing system, has
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D. Regulation of Imports by Payments Conditions
We could also classify the regulation of imports, as is evident from the analysis
and examples in the foregoing discussion, by the payments conditions
associated with the financing of the imports. Four types of such regulation
may be distinguished:
1. REMITTANCE-TYING.
As illustrated by the Israeli, Indian, and Pakistani cases noted above, im-
ports from remittances were regulated with more laxity than imports financed
from other foreign exchange funds.
2. BARTER.
Similar laxity was evident in imports financed from accumulated foreign
balances under barter and/or bilateral trade agreements in countries such as
Egypt, Ghana, and India.
3. FOREIGN CREDITS.
Again, capital goods imports in general were often easier in most coun-
tries when accompanied by foreign credits. This practice was, in fact, a
motivating factor in getting the Japanese foreign-aid program, with its
primary emphasis on yen credits for imports of Japanese machinery, off the
ground in the late 1960s.
E. Degree and Types of Restrictions on Transferability
The final dimension on which the import control regimes need to be
distinguished from one another is the degree and nature of restrictions on the
transferability of either the import licenses or the imports brought into the
country under these licenses once the other dimensions, which we have already
distinguished above, were defined.
While it may be thought that these restrictions would be fairly similar
across countries, our studies threw up remarkable contrasts. Thus, for exam-
ple, the Indian regime was characterized by extremely stringent restrictions on
the transferability of licenses and imports thereunder. The Colombian system
permitted the transfer of imports rather freely while frowning on those pro-
ducers who earned import allocations only to transfer them to other pro-
ducers. The Turkish regime seemed to have no stigma of any kind attached to
transferring licenses or imports thereunder even though this was illegal. Finally
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The restrictions on transferability were of different kinds. They related to
(1) whether the license could be sold to other parties, (2) whether the imports,
once effected, could themselves be resold to other parties, and (3) whether
these other parties had to meet certain eligibility criteria.75 Depending on how
many of these restrictions were in effect, the degree of non-transferability
could be the cause of great or little inflexibility in the system.
In India, the actual user (AU) import licenses for direct imports by pro-
ducers were generally non-transferable by individual firms, even for use by
other plants in the same firm. Combined with the equally rigid pattern of per-
missible imports—specified in itemized detail on the AU licenses in most
cases—it was inevitable that the result would be inflexibility leading to
economic inefficiency. Bhagwati and Srinivasan have speculated on the
motivations underlying this remarkably rigid regime and argued that the
theoretical premise that AU allocations were being made on the basis of well-
defined priorities at the detailed-industry level led the authorities to rule out
legal transferability of the licenses among the different industries.
Bureaucratic logic took the inevitable next step and eliminated transferability
even among units within the same industry, thus making AU licenses (legally)
altogether non-transferable by the licensee units 76
In Colombia, the situation was defacto more flexible. Carlos Daz-
Alejandro argues that:77
It is INCOMEX's expectation that goods imported in the industrial category
will be used only by the company to which the license has been issued. When IN-
COMEX was questioned about the legality of resales of merchandise imported
for industrial companies, its answers were surprisingly fuzzy. The license itself is
clearly non-negotiable, as it is issued only to a specific company or person. The
reselling of the imported items by industrial users is apparently not strictly illegal,
but it is frowned upon by INCOMEX. ... Companiesshown to be systematical-
ly selling part of their imported industrial inputs to others are punished by IN-
COMEX with total or partial rejections of future requests. Similar punishment is
dealt to individuals or companies discovered trying to import under several social
or private names. ... INCOMEX,however, does not punish temporary swap-
ping or lending of imported items among industrial firms. Indeed, it finds such
practice quite reasonable, particularly if done during periods of stringency and in
a "non-speculative" manner. Apparently, during 1971 very little reselling or
swapping of non-commercial imports took place, although some INCOMEX of-
ficials indicated that that practice was widespread during difficult years, e.g.,
1967.
It is interesting and important to note that the import control regimes,
even when characterized by the extreme rigidities of the kind just described,
had three different types of "safety valves" that helped ease the resulting bot-
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First, the establishment of links between imports and exports via import
entitlement schemes (South Korea,India),"bonus voucher" schemes
(Pakistan), "special unnumbered license" category (Ghana),78 and the like
often created a new channel for imports of scarce materials. These schemes
worked by making the import premiums the inducement for exports. Hence
the worst bottlenecks, leading to the highest premiums, tended to be relieved
through the presence of such schemes.
Second, there were always the illegal transfers of non-transferable licenses
and imports.
Third, in nearly all countries, the presence of some commercial (or trader,
established importer) licensing, as also the occasional shift of items to open
general licensing or the introduction of "automatic" licensing (Pakistan) and
"repeat" licensing (India) for producers who had used up their allocations of
imports, managed to blunt somewhat, and from time to time, the worst effects
that a rigid set of non-transferability rules would have created for those who
otherwise would not have had access to the imported items that created the
bottleneck.
III. REGULATING EXPORTS
The anatomy of direct exchange controls, when we turn to exports,is
drastically simplified for the reason that, asymmetrically with import controls,
the basic control relates mainly to the surrender of receipts to the exchange
authorities within a specified period.79 However, in several of the countries in
the Project, there were occasional instances of regulation of exports (1) by
destination, and (2) by (itemwise) composition though, naturally, there was no
counterpart to the regulation of imports by end use or by the degree of restric-
tions on transferability of licenses.
The regulation of exports via licensing, by destination, and by items can
occur simultaneously when exports of specific items need to be "diverted"
under bilateral trade agreements to fulfill prior official commitments to
deliver. On the other hand, there were few explicit instances of this nature to
be found in the countries in the Project since this task was undertaken via the
use of state trading agencies with attendant monopolization of export trade in
such items. This resulted in implicit licensing of the exports of such items by
destination (as in Egypt).
More frequent, though still uncommon, instances of (only) itemwise
regulation of exports were to be found, however, in the countries studied.
These arose from the simple need to maintain adequate domestic availabilities
of specific "sensitive" items. This was the case with vegetable (cooking) oils in
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export of vital foodstuffs and industrial goods (but this action was held in
violation of the Philippine Trade Act of 1946). Again in 1951, as an anti-
inflation measure, the reexport of "vital materials" was banned. At the same
time, restriction of exports to make the domestic price to producer-users
cheaper also was not uncommon. Thus, in Israel, the cotton Marketing Board
is not permitted, in the interest of domestic spinning establishments, to export
as much cotton as it wishes or finds profitable to sell abroad.
Itemwise regulation of exports in the interest of quality control, aimed at
maintaining long-term competitiveness for the country's exports, was also evi-
dent in some cases. Thus, in the case of Israel, the producers of citrus and
groundnuts have been obligated to sell their yield to the corresponding
marketing board, which then exports the high-quality produce and sells the
low-qualityproducedomestically.The marketing-board arrangement
therefore acts in lieu of export licensing, to restrict and regulate the export of
the items in question.
Perhaps the more noteworthy practice relating to the itemwise regulation
of exports, however, was via the fixing of export targets, much as the import
quotas were fixed for specific items. We may quote Frank and others on this:8°
Another facet of the military government's export strategy was the institu-
tion of full-scale export targetsin1962. Before the beginning of each year, the
Ministry of Commerce and Industry was to set the new year's targets on the basis
of past export performance and new export forecasts for separate commodities.
Annual export targets were usually classified by commodity, region, and country
of destination. Commodity targets were assigned to industrial associations and
firms, and the regional and country targets to South Korean trade and diplomatic
missions abroad. The Ministry maintained an "export situation room" to check
actual performance during the year against the annual targets. In addition, an Ex-
panded Export Conference, which was chaired by the President and attended by
ministers, government officials, bankers, and exporters, usually met several times
during the year to deliberate on the annual targets.
Targeting of exports to the same degree as in South Korea does not appear
to have been present in the other countries in the Project. However, the prac-
tice of tying in export obligations before new capacity was licensed seems to
have been common during the late 1960s in India and Pakistan. Carlos Diaz-
Alejandro describes the activities of the INCOMEX in Colombia in similar
terms.8'
In short, the countries in the Project either had sporadic export regula-
tions of a quantitative nature to handle critical shortages in small sectors of the
economy, or in a few instances (e.g., Egypt, Ghana, and India) were having to
divert exports geographically to fulfill barter-trade agreements, or in yet fewer
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export-augmenting device on a broad front. In none of these cases, however,
did the scope of export regulation (by quantitative, control methods) match
the scope of the control mechanism regulating imports.
IV. REGULATING SERVICES
The direct regulation of services is symmetric with the control mechanism for
imports and can be so analyzed, as we noted earlier, in terms of identical
dimensions. Thus, obvious parallel examples can be cited. For example, aid-
tying can lead, and has led, to (partial) tying of imports of shipping services to
U.S. shipping for PL480 exports in a number of countries in the Project that
were the beneficiaries of such aid. Similarly, expenditure on travel abroad has
been controlled in nearly all countries, and this control mechanism has
distinguished among classes of users, functional end use (e.g., for business, for
students, for pleasure, for visiting relatives, for medical treatment, and so on)
in much the way that imports of goods have been regulated in these regimes,82
while they have also been subject (in Chile and India, e.g.) to severe cuts at
times of exceptional foreign exchange shortage.
V. REGULATING CAPITAL FLOWS
As with the regulation of services, no particularly significant, differential
aspect of the regulation of capital flows in the countries in the Project can be
distinguished for spelling out here. However, one significant interaction effect
between capital account controls and controls on trade on current account
does need to be highlighted as it is not always appreciated. In many of the
countries in the Project there is some evidence that the need to enforce capital
account controls more effectively led to specific controls on current account.
Thus, as we note in Chapter 6 on illegal transactions under exchange control
regimes, used machinery imports were occasionally ruled out because they
facilitated capital outflows through overinvoicing. Similarly, in Turkey the
purchase of airline tickets with domestic currency had to be controlled as it
became a loophole through which Turkish liras could be converted into
foreign exchange (via resale abroad of these tickets). In Ghana refunds on air
tickets abroad were prohibited. It is indeed a moot question whether foreign
exchange controls can be made reasonably effective on capital account in the
absence of general controls on current account. This is an issue that has not
been tested for the countries in the Project as practically none of them has
managed to reach this degree of liberalization.83OVERALL SETTING 41
VI. OVERALL SETTING
We may next note that the control mechanisms and methods described and
analyzed above were combined with varying degrees of resort to a variety of
price measures in each of the countries in the Project. Thus, on the import
side, there were "prior deposit" requirements, tariffs, multiple exchange
rates, and exchange auctions, to take the most important examples. On the ex-
port side,. there was resort to duties, cash subsidies, export-import links
yielding access to lucrative imports, preferential access to profitable in-
vestments, tax rebates on imported inputs, and so on.
The exchange control regimes varied, not merely in respect to the control
mechanisms discussed so far but also in regard to their varying and variegated
resort to price measures in regulating imports and exports. In the next chapter,
we will define phases in the evolution of exchange control regimes in the coun-
tries in the Project, drawing on the blend between control and price in-
struments in the trade and payments regime as a distinguishing feature. Im-
mediately, however, we proceed to describe some of these price instruments in
depth and illustrate them from the countries in the Project.
VII. PRICE INSTRUMENTS: IMPORTS
The use of the price mechanism to influence imports was widespread among
the countries in the Project. But it took diverse forms and had varying objec-
tives. Thus, the forms extended to tariffs, "prior" or advance deposits, sales
taxes on commodities primarily imported, multiple exchange rates, exchange
auctions, and forthright parity changes. And the objectives varied from the
imposition of tariffs to mop up the premiums on the import licenses to their
use as protective devices and their deployment as an instrument to improve the
balance of payments deficit.
Since the most complex interaction of intended objectives, requiring
careful attention and analysis, arises in the case of tariffs, and since the other
price instruments raise few new issues, we focus here exclusively on the use of
tariffs, drawing on the country studies again to illustrate the alternative objec-
tives to which they were addressed. In regard to the other price instruments,
note merely two things: (1) the use of exchange auctions, while proposed in
other countries at the time,84 has been attempted in a significant manner only
for Brazil for a brief period; and (2) interestingly, the use of "prior" or ad-
vance deposits as an instrument for taxing imports has been used
predominantly in Latin American countries, to varying extent in Turkey and
Ghana, but almost never in India and Pakistan.
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ing characteristic, namely, that they are used not merely for (direct) balance of
payments objectives, as are instruments such as prior deposits, but also tradi-
tionally for revenue collection and for protection.
1. QRs VS. TARIFFS.
What is interesting, however, is that, in terms of their protective effects,
tariffs were typically "swamped" by QRs in many of the countries in the Proj-
ect for quite substantial periods. This was the case in Pakistan, Turkey, and
India for the bulk of the period studied; it was so for the Philippines and Israel
for long periods except when liberalization really took root; and it has been the
case for Chile, Colombia, and Brazil occasionally, except when multiple ex-
change rates, exchange auctions, or sliding parities served to dampen the
premium on imports. For South Korea, the only year for which evidence was
collected is 1968 when QRs were unimportant, as indeed they continued to be
later. One has indirect evidence however that, during the pre-1960 period, QRs
swamped tariffs.85
Thus, for Turkey, Anne Krueger was able to report on Ahmet Aker's data
on c.i.f. landed (inclusive of tariffs) and wholesale (inclusive of import
premium) prices for 1968, for seventy-four commodities covering 8.6 percent
of Turkey's imports.86 It turned out that, for thirty-one commodities in this
sample, the premium exceeded the landed cost, with twenty-seven of these
showing a difference in excess of 100 percent of the landed cost. The impor-
tance of the premiums is also evident from the following analysis:87
.the 1967 value of imports of each commodity in the sample was obtained.
The value of the premia as given by Aker was then computed under several
assumptions as to what mark-up would yield a normal rate of return. Three
mark-up rates were used: 20, 50 and 100 per cent. The results of the computa-
tions were: (millions of TL)
Value of imports in the sample, c.i.f. 547
Landed cost of imports 1,443
Wholesale value of imports 3,568
Premia:
20 per cent markup 1,836
50 per cent markup 1,404
100 per cent markup 682
The average EER for the sample, thus, was TL 23.76 =$1contrasted with the
official rate of TL 9 =$1.This EER is slightly above the rate calculated in Ap-
pendix A. The premium however, equalled TL 30.21, TL 23.1, or TL 11.22,
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vary from one product to another, but in this author's judgment, a 50 per cent
mark-up is probably the best estimate. On that basis, a dollar's worth of imports
cost the importer TL 23.76, and his return from it was TL 58.75,givinghim an
average windfall gain, or premium, of TL 23.11 per TL 9oflicenses received.
Thus by 1968 the premium on import licenses was considerably in excess of
the duties and surcharges imposed upon imports. Industrialists receiving import
licenses for intermediate goods imports were, in effect, subsidized by the amount
of the premium they received, and protected by the amount of the EER plus the
premium on imports competing withtheir own production. The premia
associated with final outputs were at least as high as those on intermediate
goods ... therefore,the protection afforded through quantitative restrictions
considerably exceeded that through tariffs and surcharges. Quantitative restric-
tions were thus of much greater importance than price interventions in providing
incentives for import-substituting production.
Anne Krueger also notes that the structure of import premiums bore no
relationship to the structure of landed costs. The premiums on import licenses
varied considerably from commodity to commodity, and the tariffs and sur-
charges absorbed different proportions of the final prices on these com-
modities.88
For the Philippines, Baldwin records for the period before 1962 a similar
situation. He utilizes three alternative methods to demonstrate the importance
of implicit tariffs.89 First, he estimates the implicit tariffs from surveys of
prices during 1950 and 1951, indicating that the range of implicit protection
was very large, going from nearly 400 percent to almost 700 percent on such
luxury items as oranges, cigarettes, and salt to quite moderate levels on
evaporated and condensed milk. On the other hand, the protection afforded a
given bundle of non-essential consumer goods by explicit fiscal and monetary
measures (i.e., tariffs, prior deposits, etc.) in 1951 was only 69 percent. The
comparable figure for essential consumer goods was 21 percent. Assuming
that the sample was representative, implicit rates of 200 percent or more in
1951 were not unusual for non-essential consumer goods. Since prices of this
group of items rose about 80 percent between 1951 and 1959, levels of implicit
protection of 400percentor more at this time apparently existed for some
items. Since the protection from explicit fiscal measures on this category of
goods was 149 percent, this implied that windfall gains of over 200 percent
were being made on these commodities. Second, Baldwin argues backward
from the behavior of import prices and domestic wholesale prices for the same
category of goods between 1959 and 1962 when import controls were com-
pletely dismantled. He shows that their peso cost, inclusive of tariffs, and so
on, rose by 90 percent during the period whereas the wholesale price index for
this group of non-essential consumer goods rose by only 10 percent, indicating
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utilizes comparisons between U.S. and Philippines prices of comparable goods
for selected items, estimating what the Philippines prices should be (based on
U.S. prices plus transportation, tariff, and other charges) and what they ac-
tually were. Baldwin concludes from these statistical analyses that:9°
It is clear from these three estimates that exchange controls added greatly to
the degree of protection provided by explicit fiscal and monetary measures. In
1959, for example, implicit protective rates of 400 percent were not uncommon
for nonessential consumer goods, whereas the average explicit degree of protec-
tion in 1959 for this category was around 150 percent. For the essential-consumer-
goods group, average implicit and explicit protective rates in the same years were
roughly 30 and 5 percent, respectively.
Clark Leith records for Ghana in 1968 a situation where QRs were impor-
tant for a fair number of industries. While he could not obtain premium data
for twenty out of the forty-seven industries for which he estimated protection,
thirteen out of the remaining twenty-seven had implicit tariffs in excess of the
explicit tariffs.9' By 1970, with the imposition of an import surcharge on
several items and the shift of these items to open general licensing, the role of
import premiums had declined but still persisted in a few industries.92
For India, the evidence of the importance of implicit tariffs is quite over-
whelming. Indeed, except for a period of three years after the June 1966
devaluation, the dominance of implicit over explicit tariffs seems to have been
quite general. Thus, as with Leith in Ghana, the analysis of protection in India
would have been totally misleading if Bhagwati and Srinivasan had not ana-
lyzed it on the basis of implicit protection.93
For Israel also, Michaely notes that, as of 1956, moderate to strong
restrictions affected over half of the total value of imported goods, with only
raw materials bearing a small brunt of this regime (Table 2-3). Indeed, until
the liberalization of the 1960s, the protection of industries producing final
consumer goods by import prohibition was "comprehensive and almost
total.
Table2.3.Effectiveness of Import Restrictions in Israel, 1956













Foodstuffs and fodder 40 4 56 100
Raw materials 60 32 8 100
Finished goods 35 33 32 100
Totalimportofgoocls 45 31 24 100
Source: Israel, op. cit., Chapter 2, Table 2-3.PRICE INSTRUMENTS: IMPORTS 45
In none of the countries in the Project, however, were explicit tariffs
altogether dominated by implicit tariffs. Nearly all countries had open general
licensing or, as with South Korea since the mid-1960s, items not on any import
lists were available for free importation.95 Nor did any countries in the Project
forego the use of explicit tariffs for any length of time for, as already stated,
the use of explicit tariffs could be addressed to several objectives, including
that of reducing the magnitude of the implicit tariff by cutting into the import
premium resulting from QRs. Indeed, we turn now to a discussion of the
tariffs as addressed, exante, tothese diverse objectives, treating tariffs to mop
up premiums and tariffs to provide protection, in turn.
2. TARIFFS TO Mo UP PREMIUMS.
Tariffs with the explicit objective of depriving import licenses of their
windfall premiums were adopted in some of the countries in the Project. Such
tariffs naturally bear close affinity to tariffs customarily adopted for revenue
purposes insofar as the premiums are turned thereby into governmental
revenue.
The Ghanaian surcharges of August 1970 and the Indian tariffs of 1964
and 1965 clearly fall into this category. However, the most striking example
comes from South Korea where Frank and others note:
With the adoption of a unitary fixed exchange rate in June 1961, the dif-
ferential between the import price and the domestic price became greater for some
items restricted by import quota. Thus in July 1961, a Temporary Special
Customs Law was enacted to capture the windfall profits that would otherwise
accrue to importers receiving import licenses for restricted items. Under the law,
about 700itemssubject to import quotas were classified into four categories, I
to IV, in order based on the ratio between the domestic price and the c.i.f. import
price and the estimated degree of nonessentiality. A temporary special tariff was
imposed on these classified import items in addition to regular tariffs. The special
rates were 100 percent of import value on category I, 50 percent on category II, 30
percent on category III, and 10 percent on category IV. Adjustments were made
periodically in the classification of items..
Alsoafter the May 1964 devaluation, a new Temporary Special Tariff Law
was enacted to soak up margins between c.i.f. import prices and domestic prices
of restricted import items. About 2,200 import commodities, for which the
"foreign exchange ratio" exceeded 30 percent, were classified in categories I and
II. The special tariff was imposed on the difference between the domestic
wholesale price of an imported good and the landed price of that import plus
regular tariff, commodity tax, incidental expenses, and normal profit. A tariff
rate of 90 percent was applied to category I and 70 percent to category II.
To administer the special tariff, the Bank of Korea and the Ministry of
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ties. On the basis of this price survey, the list of items for the special tariff was ex-
panded from about 2,200 in 1964 to about 2,700 after 1965. Those items to which
a regular tariff did not apply were, however, exempted from the special tariff.
[Foreign exchange ratio =(domesticwholesale price of imported goods) minus
(regular tariff + commodity tax + normal expenses) divided by (normal foreign
exchange price of the import on c.i.f. basis). This formula was basically an
estimate of the premium which could be obtained by an importer licensed to im-
port a restricted item.]
3. PROTECTIVE TARIFFS.
We next consider the relative importance of protective tariffs, as recom-
mended by regulatory agencies such as tariff commissions and boards, as
distinct from tariffs levied during the budgetary process explicitly for purposes
other than the protection of domestic import-competing industries.97 It is in-
teresting to note, here, that even the ex ante role of tariffs as protective devices
had shrunk in many of the countries in the Project. Thus, in India and
Pakistan, detailed analysis shows that the tariff commissions had often been
reduced to a relatively minor role, with few industries appearing before them
for the purpose of claiming tariff protection.98 Clearly, most industries were
sufficiently protected by the QR system and did not therefore feel it necessary
to argue the traditional protective case before a regulatory body!
A question of some interest is then why a few industries did ask for tariff
protection. Here, the answer seems to lie in the possible desire of these in-
dustries to provide for a rock-bottom rate of protection just in case the QR
regime was changed and the protective incidence of quotas was eroded. After
all, payments positions could ease, criteria of allocation of imports could shift,
and there was therefore not the same level of assurance perhaps about the con-
tinuity of QR protection.
VIII. PRICE INSTRUMENTS: EXPORTS
In conclusion of our taxonomy, we now may address briefly the range of price
instruments utilized to affect exports. Aside from parity changes, these price
instruments divide into direct (cash) subsidies and taxes and indirect subsidy
and tax schemes. The latter, in turn, take numerous forms as is evident from
the country studies in the Project, and quite clearly have differential economic
effects.
Examples of direct taxes and subsidies can be found in South Korea,
Pakistan, India, and other countries. Typically, because of the "large-country"
(i.e., monopoly power in trade) problem associated with exports of primary
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position, some of the countries in the Project used export taxes while using ex-
port subsidies on manufactured exports instead mainly to counter the export-
reducing effects of overvaluation of the exchange rate.
The role of direct cash subsidies, however, appears to have been minimal,
with substantial emphasis being placed in most countries on the indirect
schemes. Leaving aside the routine schemes offering rebates and drawbacks,
and also marketing and credit advantages, the major indirect instruments for
export subsidization were essentially those that exploited the exchange controls
on imports to channel the premiums associated with the restricted imports to
those who successfully exported. Examples of these "link" schemes can be
found in South Korea, Pakistan, and India where they were formally instituted
(as already noted in our taxonomy of the direct controls of imports), whereas
they were informally used in other countries such as Colombia (where, as
Carlos Diaz-Alejandro has noted, the INCOMEX gently but effectively also
managed to prod the import licensees into export performance by implicit
threats of not so favorable treatment of import requests if the exports did not
materialize).99 In turn, these links set up numerous efficiency implications.
These have been systematically analyzed in the India study in the Project,
which the reader may wish to consult,'°° and are addressed more generally here
in the concluding Chapter 8 on the optimal foreign trade strategy suggested by
the results of the Project.
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